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A Behavioral Approach to the Political and Economic Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations 
 
Peter Boettke∗ 
 
Abstract 
Deirdre McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity (2010) represents another breakthrough work in 
her career, and the second volume in a multi-volume work on the economic and 
intellectual history of western civilization.  In a sense, the subtitle of the book explains 
well what this volume is all about--why economics can’t explain the modern world.  An 
important modifier would be – modern economics can’t explain the modern world – 
because much of what McCloskey argues is the resurrection of an older argument that 
was associated with classical liberal political economists from Smith, Bastiat, Mises, 
Hayek and Friedman.  Fundamentally, she reasserts the power of ideas to shape the 
world.  McCloskey’s narrative is simple and compelling -- materialist stories (whether 
technological, genetic, or institutional) do not work; incentive based stories do not 
provide a complete picture of why some countries grew rich while others remained poor, 
let alone for the exact timing for the divergence in the wealth and poverty of nations with 
the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th century.  McCloskey proposes that incentive 
based explanations must reside within a broader narrative that addresses values and 
beliefs, as well as institutions, technologies, and material conditions.  In doing so, 
McCloskey paves the way for a true behavioral approach to a political and economic 
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
 
JEL Codes:  N00; O10; P10 
 
A tide of opinion, once it flows strongly, tends to sweep over all obstacles, 
all contrary views. 
 
  -- Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (1980, 284) 
 
Deirdre McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity (2010) critically engages the theoretical and 
historical literature on the rise of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, and then traces 
out the implications of that argument for the 20th and 21st centuries.  It is a breathtaking 
intellectual tour and its emphasis on the shift of rhetoric concerning the bourgeois, 
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commercial activity, and entrepreneurial innovation in the Dutch Republic, in Britain, in 
France, and in the US during the pivotal years of the Industrial Revolution is as 
refreshing as it is rewarding.  McCloskey is a thorough historical scholar and a gifted 
writer.  But I want to contend that she is able to persuade in her endeavor because she is a 
brilliant analytical economist.  If she wasn’t such a good economist, then her critique of 
the efforts by other economists to explain modern economic growth would be only so 
much “talk” about “talk” so to speak.  But because she is a skilled economist, McCloskey 
is able to put “talk” at the center of her analytic narrative of modern economic growth 
and to do so convincingly.  The Samuelsonian economists must be reminded of the 
Smithian political economy that came before, which is capable of transforming current 
practice precisely because it can explain more.  Such an implicit endorsement of contra-
whig history of ideas will run into serious resistance unless offered by a master 
economist.1  
 If you do a Google Scholar search for D.N. McCloskey, then you will discover 
soon after references to her work on the rhetoric of economics, the impressive citation 
impact of her work on statistical significance, her work on applied price theory, and her 
work on the economic history of Britain.  She often says jokingly that she spent the first 
half of her career developing the sort of “prudence only” explanations that she now 
rejects, but this actually is not that accurate of a description if you read closely her work 
on applied price theory.  Yes, Max U is a central character in her earlier manifestation as 
an economist, but never as the only character.  And, if you read her recent work closely 
you will see that as much as she might want to push the boundaries of her economics 
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theorizing, she is an economist through and through.2  The unifying theme throughout 
McCloskey’s work as an economist and economic historian are not only rational choice 
analytics and competitive market mechanics, but a deep and abiding appreciation for the 
gains from trade, the gains from innovation, and the gains from social cooperation under 
the division of labor.  And, the unique institutional pre-requisites that are required to 
realize all these gains.  But she is striving to place all of this human activity within its 
broader social and cultural context.  She is situating activities within the environment of 
“talk” about those very activities.  
 McCloskey respects both Adam Smith’s observation that man has a natural 
propensity to “truck, barter and exchange” and Thomas Hobbes’s observation that life 
can indeed by “nasty, brutish and short” when man’s propensity to rape, pillage and 
plunder is unchecked by either social convention or formal institutions of law and order.  
Which human propensity is pursued will be a function of the broader social context 
(including not just the pattern of institutions that are defined and enforced, but the 
conversation that exists about the moral legitimacy of those institutions).  In short, in 
McCloskey’s analytic narrative of the Industrial Revolution the idea that incentives 
matter can be found, but it isn’t the main explanatory factor; and the idea that institutions 
matter can also be found, but again it isn’t the main explanatory factor.  Instead, 
McCloskey stresses that “ideas matter”-- and in particular the ideas that influence 
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political and popular “talk” about commercial life and entrepreneurial innovation.  This 
set of human activities was attributed a sort of dignity that was unique to that time and 
place, and that explains the “take off”.  The ideas that emerged from the “talk” of 17th 
century Dutch Republic, 18th century Britain, and 19th century France and the US 
explains the Industrial Revolution, its spread and its transformation of the modern world.  
The rise of science contributed; the conflation of science, technological innovation, and 
commercial entrepreneurship contributed; the improvement of the quality of institutions 
that lowered the risk of appropriation contributed; the expansion of trade contributed; 
BUT the cause was a widespread and significant shift in public opinion about the life and 
activities of the bourgeoisie that unleashed all those contributing factors to produce the 
Industrial Revolution and change the course of modern history.  
 In The Bourgeois Virtues (2006), McCloskey had explained the search for a 
morality for the commercial society to contrast with the ancient virtues of the warrior or 
hero culture, or the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity.  She also revealed her 
concern with the caricature of economists as offering “Prudence Only” explanations.  But 
of course Adam Smith wasn’t a prudence only theorist.  In a review of The Bourgeois 
Virtues, I argued that perhaps the best way to understand McCloskey’s contribution is to 
see her book as the book Adam Smith would have written had he combined The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations into one book.  (see Boettke 2007) 
McCloskey also demonstrates in The Bourgeois Virtues that traditional society as 
opposed to commercial society did not exhibit such a moral life. (see McCloskey 2006, 
139-148)  There are no moral bonus points for living in poverty, squalor and ignorance.  
Modernity is a blessing, not a curse.  The village was not a place of harmony, but one of 
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conflict, murder, rape, and theft.  Commercial life, on the other hand, civilized man and 
provided mankind with amazing material means to pursue ends from the highest ideals to 
the basest of desires.  Capitalism, she argues, does not need to be radically modified, let 
alone abolished, for it to be moral.  “In a fallen world,” she wrote, “the bourgeois life is 
not perfect. But it’s better than any alternatives.” (2006, 1) 
 McCloskey’s Bourgeois Virtues and Bourgeois Dignity can be seen as making the 
critical Hayekian point that an economist who only knows economics is not only a poor 
social scientist but perhaps an outright danger to the society he or she populates.  But she 
also can be read as pointing out that the only thing more dangerous than an economist 
who knows only economics might be a moral philosopher who knows no economics 
whatsoever.  Moral philosophy cannot answer the questions that can be answered only 
with factual inquiry.  And the logic of economic analysis cannot be dismissed solely 
because it doesn’t confirm the prejudices of the clerisy.  McCloskey’s call is for a 
humanomics.3  In other contexts, I have described Elinor Ostrom’s work as rational 
choice as if the choosers were human, and institutional analysis as if history mattered.4  
On this, as in many other areas, Elinor and Deirdre are working along similar, though 
separate lines, of inquiry into the human condition and how we can come to live better 
together through social processes of communication and cooperation.  This is the true 
behavioral approach to political economy, not the currently fashionable effort to highlight 
how human foibles lead to deviations from the Max U model of man.  Rather than 
anomalies, a behavioral approach to political economy treats human actors as fallible but 
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capable, who interact with other fallible but capable human actors and enter into 
economic and social relations with one another in specific institutional ecologies.  The 
behavioral approach to which I am attributing McCloskey’s work on virtues, beliefs, 
attitudes, and public opinion about the bourgeois life is in the same intellectual vein as 
that laid out by Vernon Smith in his Nobel Lecture where he contrasted constructivist and 
ecological rationality. (see Smith 2003) The behavioral approach of Smith, Ostrom and 
McCloskey is ecological and eschews constructivism, just as Adam Smith, David Hume, 
and F. A. Hayek did before them. 
 But let’s get back to my main contention in this essay, and that is that 
McCloskey’s work can be seen as a behavioral approach to the political and economic 
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.  David Hume long ago argued 
that civil society required for its operation three core principles: private property, the 
keeping of promises embedded in contracts, and the transference of property by consent.  
One way to think about McCloskey’s argument is that widely held public opinion 
legitimates or condemns certain values, beliefs and actions associated with Hume’s 
property, contract and consent condition.  I have argued in an essay on the role of 
spiritual capital in economic development that the underlying values and beliefs in a 
society either lowers or raises the transaction costs associated with economic exchange 
relations.  (see Boettke 2010b)  When the widely held values and beliefs in a community 
align with property, contract and consent, then exchange relationships do not depend for 
their existence on the formal apparatus of law and order.  In such a society the costs of 
formal enforcement are lower, and specialization and exchange can spread relatively 
unimpeded.  But in a society where every exchange can only be undertaken through the 
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watchful eye of the formal apparatus of coercion (police and courts; or the watchful eye 
of the moralist whether priest, rabbi, or imam), then specialization and exchange will 
have a limited span (at least in the official above ground economy.) 
 McCloskey’s narrative of modern economic growth is not focused on the 
mechanics of economic growth-- neither the division of labor, nor technological 
innovation, and not even the development of a tolerable administration of justice 
(institutions!).  McCloskey’s narrative of modern economic growth is ultimately about 
the spiritual in economic growth.5  I am not sure if she would agree with my language 
choice since she focuses on the rhetoric and the active “talk”, but basically she is arguing 
that when commercial activity is not only legitimated, but applauded, by the people 
(including but not limited to the elites) in any specific society at any specific time, then 
the mechanics of economic development will be unleashed.  In other words, the cause of 
economic development is ideas that give dignity to the bourgeoisie, while the various 
mechanisms through which economic development is realized are unleashed due to shifts 
in ideas.  As McCloskey goes to great pains to point out, the timing and the historical 
specifics do not align to simply rely on the mechanisms alone to tell the story of modern 
economic growth.  But a documented shift in ideas in each of the particular national 
circumstances does, and the same can be seen she argues in the contemporary world 
when we look at China and India.  When the ancient virtues of the warrior are supplanted 
by the commercial virtues of the bourgeoisie, economic growth follows.  Modern 
civilization is a consequence of ideas, and its biggest threat is ideas.  This is why the 
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central message of The Bourgeois Virtues is so vital for setting the stage for the argument 
in Bourgeois Dignity.  McCloskey’s work strongly affirms the wonderfully worded 
passage of Keynes (1936, 383) on the power of ideas to shape the world in which we live: 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who 
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back. (emphasis added) 
 
“Language,” Mises (1949, 177) wrote, “is a tool of thinking as it is a tool of social 
action.”  Beliefs and expectations give rise to actions, and actions result in consequences. 
And, all of human action takes place within social and cultural contexts.  The problem 
with modern Samuelsonian economics is that it has proceeded as if man is disembodied 
from context.  The history of the modern institutionalist counter-revolution in economics 
--public choice, property rights, law and economics, new economic history, market 
process theory, etc.-- is the history of the long trek back from the institutionally antiseptic 
theory of Samuelsonian economics.  But as the German philosopher and sociologists, 
Hans Albert (1979) warned his friends in the New Institutionalist movement, neoclassical 
economics will never be able to repair its institutional deficiency until it repairs its 
behavioral deficiency.  In McCloskey’s language, Max U cannot be the central character 
of economics if we hope to have an institutionally and historically informed narrative of 
the modern economic world, let alone one that gives primary status to ideas.  When 
McCloskey (2010, 297) points to Doug North, of all people, as still being a Samuelsonian 
economist down to his wing-tipped shoes, I believe she is making the same point as Hans 
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Albert made.6  This is, of course, that same point Mises made at the very beginning of 
Human Action (1949, 1-142), though most critics focus exclusively on his 
methodological pronouncements, rather than the substantive claims he is making about 
economic analysis.  In those early pages of his treatise, Mises explains why the closed 
model of man does not suffice to capture the human actor in society.  The argument in 
Human Action attempts to spell out clearly why the maximizing model of man and the 
perfectly competitive model of the market is incapable of providing an understanding of 
the choosing actor and the dynamic entrepreneurial economy, and as such cannot engage 
in the sort of comparative institutional analysis which has been the hallmark of economic 
thinking since Smith explained the failure of Mercantilism and the success of free trade, 
or Say explained the self-correcting capacity of the market, or Mill explained the amazing 
resiliency of free economies to bounce back after either natural disasters (such as fire, 
earthquakes or floods) or man-made disasters (such as war).  It was precisely because 
modern technical economics had adopted the closed model of man, that economists were 
blind to the consequences of socialism with respect to social cooperation under the 
division of labor that Mises had identified with the problem of economic calculation 
under collective property.  It was also the case, as Mises attempted to show, that with a 
closed model of man and an equilibrium theory of the market, the insidious role that the 
manipulation of money and credit had on the economic system would be hidden from 
view.  But following the logic of the Misesian argument would take us too far afield for 
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the task at hand7 – the assessment of McCloskey’s case for a behavioral approach to the 
economic inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.  For our purposes, 
the bottom line is that Max U just doesn’t work in the study of human action, though it 
might work in a toy economy populated by robots.  Samuelsonian economics (whether 
practiced at MIT or Chicago) is the economics of toy economies, not the economics of 
real economies that exist in time and in particular places.  Max U is indistinguishable 
from other animals – rats and pigeons, etc. – but the human animal that populates 
historical economies reasons, the human animal speaks, the human animal forms 
friendships, forges political alliances, gossips with their neighbors, and forms world 
views.  Those world views shape social relations as they help form the understandings of 
cause and effect in human action.  Robots don’t have ideas, they don’t act.    Human’s 
act; human’s believe; human’s live in historical circumstances.  It is human actors that are 
free and responsible beings, who participate and try to prosper in a free market economy, 
and who strive to live within and be actively engaged in caring communities.  It is human 
actors that come up with new ideas, recognize the gains from trade and the gains from 
innovation, and act upon the opportunity for those gains by engaging in enterprise.  As 
economists we want to study human economies, not toy economies.  This is what 
McCloskey is talking about when she speaks of humanomics, and it is reflected in her 
analytic narrative about how the critical juncture in the modern world was the sudden 
attribution of dignity to the bourgeois life provided the fuel that unleashed capitalism and 
transformed the world.  When dignity and liberty are for ordinary people extraordinary 
things can happen, and did happen in the 17th, 18th and 19th century.  McCloskey is even 
                                                
7 However, the reader should consult the brilliant discussion of the implications of the closed and single-
exit theories in contrast to open and process theories found in Richard Wagner’s Mind, Society and Human 
Action (2010). 
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willing to put the chain of combustible forces in an easy to read form for the modern 
economist. (see 2010, 406ff)  
 Deirdre McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity is an amazing tour through the facts and 
theories concerning the Industrial Revolution as well as modern economic growth.  Her 
emphasis is on ideas, and in particular the spread of ideas related to the dignity of the 
bourgeois life.  Entrepreneurial activity – both in terms of the art of the deal and the 
innovative impulse – must be embedded within an ideology that not only respects it but 
encourages it as a worthy vocational calling for the best and the brightest to pursue.  It 
has to be widely understood that tinkering with technologies and trading in goods and 
services can improve the lives of the masses if permitted.  Economic science is about 
logic and evidence, and economic life (the bargaining over resources and the seeking of 
profit) will exist whether economists understand it or not. But the widespread 
development of economic life does require ideas that legitimate and identify the activities 
associated with economic life as morally worthy endeavors.   
A central message of economics from Smith to Hayek has been that we do not 
have to understand in order to have and benefit from the spontaneous order of the market.  
But a central message of Smith, Ricardo, Say, Mill, Mises and Hayek has been that while 
it may not be essential to understand in order to have, it very well may be essential to 
cultivate an understanding of the spontaneous order of the market among the population 
in order to sustain that order and realize its benefits on a wide scale.  This enlisting of the 
economist in the “battle of ideas” over economic freedom and economic prosperity was 
central to the careers of Smith, Say and Bastiat, Mises and Hayek, Friedman, thought not 
Stigler, but certainly Buchanan.  Deirdre McCloskey joins that list of those contributing 
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to our understanding of the relationship between economic freedom (and the dignity and 
liberty it affords to ordinary people) and the wealth and poverty of nations.   
McCloskey not only contributes to our scholarly understanding in a significant 
way by tackling one of the great mysteries of the sciences of man – the Rise of the West--
but joins the contemporary battle of ideas with her multi-volume works on capitalism.  
When bourgeois virtues do not thrive, she documents, the results are very sad indeed for 
the people.  This point about the importance of ideas to shape the world is worthy of 
several volumes of writings, and hours of lectures to make sure the message is effectively 
communicated – who and what societies attribute in their “talk” are to be dignified and 
granted liberty to matters for human welfare.  When the bourgeoisie are accorded dignity 
and liberty, the least advantaged among us are made significantly better off and the 
society as a whole achieves a level of material well-being that seems impossible to our 
ancestors.  McCloskey’s task is two-fold: we have to cultivate in our broader culture a 
new “talk” about the bourgeoisie, commercial life, and entrepreneurial innovation; and, 
we have to reorient political economy and historical scholarship away from an exclusive 
focus on resources and ruthless efficiency and towards the humanistic science of man 
“that honors number and word, interest and rhetoric, behavior and meaning” (2010, 450) 
must be praised and encouraged --- and accorded the dignity and liberty of inquiry that 
will encourage such scientific and scholarly entrepreneurship among contemporary 
economists and political economists. 
Congratulations to Deirdre McCloskey for another amazing contribution, and I for 
one cannot wait for the Bourgeois Re-Evaluation to appear in print and to continue her 
 13 
effort to forge a behavioral approach to the political and economic inquiry into the nature 
and causes of the wealth of nations. 
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